Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have single-unit demand or bidders are risk-neutral with independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price auctions with private values need not possess familiar monotonicity properties. In particular, equilibria in weakly undominated strategies may exist in which some bidders bid strictly less on some units when they have strictly higher values for every unit.
In many applications, however, there are few enough participants that individual bidders have market power. See e.g. Wolfram [5] on evidence of market power in electricity auction markets.
Unfortunately, bidding behavior in uniform-price auctions with only a few bidders is still relatively poorly understood, although certain special cases have been well studied. For example, Fudenberg, Mobius, and Szeidl [2] and Reny and Perry [4] have made substantial progress in the case in which bidders have single-unit demand, while McAdams [3] considers the case in which bidders have multi-unit demand but are risk-neutral with independent types. These papers establish existence of a monotone pure strategy equilibrium, meaning that each bidder never bids strictly less on any unit given weakly higher values for every unit. Indeed, in the benchmark case with risk-neutrality and independent private values, McAdams shows that every equilibrium of the uniform-price auction must be monotone. 
and ex post utility is
, where u i is a weakly increasing and concave function of surplus.
, and non-monotone otherwise.
In each of the examples to follow, I establish existence of a (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium in weakly undominated pure strategies and show that some bidder adopts a non-monotone strategy in all such equilibria. 2 
Relaxing independence
When bidders' values are affiliated, each bidder expects to face stiffer competition when he has higher values. This effect may induce some bidders to bid less aggressively on some units given higher values. For instance, in Ex-ample 1, bidder 1 faces an opponent who wants only one unit. Since bidder 2 will always bid zero on a second unit (in any weakly undominated strategy), bidder 1 can guarantee himself one unit at zero price by bidding zero on a second unit. Or, bidder 1 could compete for a second unit and, in doing so, raise the price that he pays for a first unit. As bidder 1's values increase, he expects bidder 2 to bid more aggressively. This increases the cost to bidder 1 of competing for a second unit, so much so that bidder 1 prefers to concede a unit to his opponent when he has high enough values for both units. In any weakly undominated strategy, each bidder must bid truthfully on the first unit and bid no more than his value on a second unit; hence In this case, it is easy to check that bidder 1's unique best response is to bid one on the second unit.
We have shown by construction that an equilibrium exists in weakly undominated strategies. Since b 1,2 (2, 2) ≥ 1 > 0 = b 1,2 (4, 4), bidder 1's strategy is non-monotone in all such equilibria.
Relaxing risk-neutrality
When a bidder is risk-averse, his incremental utility from a second unit decreases as his willingness to pay for the first unit increases. Consequently, a risk-averse bidder may prefer to bid less on a second unit given higher values on both units. For instance, in Example 2, bidder 1 bids his value for a second unit given relatively low values but bids zero on a second unit given relatively high values. In any weakly undominated strategy, 
for allb ∈ [0,
] and
for allb ∈ [1/4, 1]. As can be easily checked, (2) 
